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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL HOFFMAN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AM.ERICA, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 18184 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for insurance proceeds under an acci-
dental death insurance policy covering Louis Hoffman. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Honorable Dean E. Condor who 
found that the death of Louis Hoffman was not accidental. 
Judgment was entered for defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Life Insurance Company of North America re-
quests that this Court affirm the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment of the Trial Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Carol Hoffman is the owner of a group acciden-
tal death insurance policy provided through an employment 
program covering my husband Louis Hoffman ("Louis"). As 
defined in the policy, an accidental death is a death·"re-
sulting directly and independently of all other causes from 
bodily injuries caused by accident." (Plaintiff's Ex. 2, R. 
182) 
During the evening of February 7, 1979, Carol told Louis 
that she had spoken with an attorney about a divorce. (R. 
117) Carol and Louis then discussed a property division dur-
ing which Louis drank an alcoholic beverage. (R. 178, 189, 
190, 193, 194) Louis then went to his son's bedroom and 
obtained a .357 magnum revolver which he fired outside the 
home to demonstrate that it was loaded. (R. 179, 180, 234) 
Louis expressly and impliedly threatened Carol's life. (R. 
184-188) He also forcibly disabled the telephone when Carol 
was talking to the "911" operator requesting police assis-
tance. Carol fled to a neighbor's home where she called the 
Salt Lake Police Department for help. (R. 179, 180) (Find-
ings, Nos. 6, 7 and 8) 
After Carol fled, Louis went to his mother's house where 
he telephoned his home and spoke with his adult daughter, 
Karee. He convinced her that he was at the United Airlines 
-2-
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desk at the airport and that she should come immediately to 
the airport to meet him. (R. 187-189, 232-234) 
Instead of meeting his daughter at the airport, Louis 
drove back to his home where he was spotted by Officer Lor-
raine Killpack who was then investigating the incident. 
Officer Killpack had correctly deduced that the "airport" 
call was a ruse to separate Karee from her mother. She 
encouraged Carol and Karee to go to a safe place. (R. 206, 
207) Officer Killpack was assisted by Officers Frank 
Hatton-Ward and Gil Salazar, each driving in a separate 
patrol car. (R. 203) 
The officers tried to stop and arrest Louis by verbal 
commands over their loudspeakers and with flashing lights and 
sirens. Louis failed and refused to respond to their com-
mands. After a low-speed chase, Louis again drove to his 
home and pulled into the driveway where he was confronted by 
the three officers. (R. 135-138, 153-158, 208-210) Officer 
Hatton-Ward, standing at the open passenger-side window of 
Louis' vehicle with Officer Salazar standing to his immediate 
right, ordered Louis to put his gun down and freeze. Louis 
failed and refused to comply with these lawful commands. (R. 
160-165) Instead he attempted to leave the vehicle in a way 
which Officers Hatton-Ward and Salazar believed was life 
-3-
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threatening. They both shot and killed Louis. (R. 143, 144, 
149-151, 164-167) (Findings, Nos. 9-11, 13-16) 
In a separate case before the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, a wrongful death action against 
Salt Lake City Corporation was brought for Louis' death. In 
that case the court ruled that as a matter of law the off i-
cers had the duty and right to arrest Louis under the exist-
ing circumstances. The jury held the offiers' conduct was 
reasonable and returned a defense verdict. This ruling and 
verdict were not appealed and the time for appeal has ex-
pired. (Findings, No. 12) 
Carol Hoffman brought this action claiming that Louis 
suffered an accidental death. Life Insurance Company of 
North America denied coverage upon the ground that Louis' 
death was not accidental and therefore not within the insur-
ing clause of the policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LOUIS' DEATH WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL SINCE IT 
WAS THE NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF 
HIS LIFE-THREATENING ACTIONS. 
The primary issue is whether Louis' death was acciden-
tal. It would be accidental if it resulted "directly and 
independently of all other causes from bodily injuries caused 
by accident." 
-4-
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In reviewing claims for accidental death benefits, this 
Court has uniformly held that an accidental death is one 
which is reasonably unforeseeable, a death which is not the 
natural and probable consequence of the insured's actions. 
A comprehensive explanation of this rule is found· in 
Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 106 
Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319 (1944). There this Court was asked to 
determine whether a death following surgery was accidental 
under an insurance policy. In reviewing its longstanding 
definition of accidental death, the court indicated that the 
word "accidental" should be viewed in the relation of causes 
to their effects. Where a death is by actual design or the 
natural and probable consequence of the insured's actions, it 
is not accidental: 
An effect which is the natural and probable conse-
quence of an act or course of action is not an acci-
dent, nor is it produced by accidental means. It is 
either the result of actual design, or it falls under 
the maxim that every man must be held to intend the 
natural and probable consequence of his deeds. 147 
P.2d at 322. 
This reasonable unforeseeability rule was recently ap-
plied in Elton v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 30 Utah 
2d 213, 516 P.2d 165 (1973). There it was claimed that the 
insured's death from a heart attack was accidental. In again 
applying the reasonable unforeseeability rule, this Court 
held: 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"[A]ll of the definitions" of accident "include the 
idea that the means as well as the result must be 
unforeseen, involuntary, unexpected and unusual; that 
it must be a happening by chance." [Emphasis by the 
Court] 516 P.2d at 173. 
Under Utah's long standing reasonable unforeseeability 
rule, appellant had the burden of proving that Louis'·death 
was not the natural and probable consequence of his actions. 
Based upon the evidence, the trial court found that the con-
trary was true, that Louis' death was the natural and proba-
ble consequence of his actions. As this Court has recently 
reaffirmed, the standard for appellate review is whether the 
trial court's "findings are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence." Garcia v. Schwendimar, No. 17559 (Utah, April 1, 
1982). Thus, unless appellant shows that this finding was 
clearly erroneous, it must stand. 
Louis threatened his wife while brandishing a gun. Not 
only did he fire the gun, but he also forcibly disabled the 
telephone. He lied to his daughter both as to where he was 
and where he would meet her. When commanded by police offi-
cers to surrender, he refused and led them on a low-speed 
chase. When he finally stopped, he was commanded by the 
officers to drop his gun, which he refused to do. As ob-
served by Officer Salazar, Louis pointed the gun at a fellow 
officer whereupon Salazar fired. As observed by Officer Hat-
-6-
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ton-Ward, Louis moved in such a way that the officer could no 
longer see the gun. Believing that the gun was aimed where 
another officer was positioned, he shot. (R. 143, 144, 
165-169). Based upon these uncontested facts, Louis' death 
was the natural and probable consequence of his actions. It 
was not an accidental death. 
Appellant argues that Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company, 104 Utah 75, 138 P.2d 239 (1943), compels the 
conclusion that Louis' death was accidental. In Sanders a 
15-year-old boy had escaped from an Industrial School. While 
free, he burglarized a store and stole a car. While in the 
stolen automobile he and his 14-year-old companion, who was 
driving, were spotted by the Sheriff. While fleeing from the 
Sheriff, their car crashed resulting in their deaths. The 
court applied the reasonable unforeseeability rule noted in 
Handley and held that it could not be said that the boy's 
death was the natural and probable consequence of his being a 
. d' 1 passenger in a spee ing car. 
1 In Sanders the court also considered and rejected the 
insurance company's claim that as a matter of public 
policy recovery should not be allowed since the boy was 
violating the law at the time of his death. Respondent 
has not and does not advocate this theory. 
-7-
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The similarity between Sanders and the present case is 
two-fold. First, both cases involve an insured who was vio-
lating the law. However, this is not determinative of whe-
ther the death was accidental. Second, in both cases the 
standard applied was whether the death was the natural and 
probable consequence of the insured's actions. In Sanders 
the court found that death was not the natural and probable 
consequence of speeding. This is a well-recognized observa-
tion of many motorists. Although the risk or probability of 
an accident or collision probably increases when the speed 
limit is exceeded, there is not a high correlation of such 
effect. Thousands of motorists exceed the speed limit each 
day and none expect to be hurt or killed as a result. Arming 
oneself, threatening death or serious injury to another, re-
fusing to respond to a peace officer's lawful commands and 
refusing to disarm on command is not a parallel action to 
exceeding a posted limit. The reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences are vastly different. Therefore, the trial court 
found and the evidence supports a finding that Louis' death 
was the natural and probable consequence of his life threa-
tening actions. 
As stated in the annotation relied upon by appellant, 
recovery may be had under an accidental death policy even 
though the death occurred while violating the law only if it 
-8-
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is determined "that the circumstances were such that the in-
sured could not reasonably have foreseen or expected the in-
jury or death." 43 A.L.R. 3d 1120 at 1124. 
Since Louis' death was the natural and probable conse-
quence of his actions, it was not accidental. 
POINT II 
THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS INTENDED TO SHOOT 
LOUIS WHEN HE THREATENED THE LIVES OF 
OTHERS DOES NOT ESTABLISH AN ACCIDENTAL 
DEATH. 
Appellant suggests that when "death [is] produced by the 
intentional conduct of those other than the insured," every 
jurisdiction considering the question has found such a death 
to be accidental. Appellant's Brief, p. 8. To the contrary, 
what the cases hold is that death caused by the intentional 
conduct of a third person does not preclude the possiblity 
that the death may have been accidental. As stated in the 
annotation relied upon by appellant, where a third person 
inflicts the injury or death, the question whether the death 
is accidental generally turns "on a determination of whether 
the insured, by his actions, should have reasonably expected 
the violent outcome." 49 A.L.R. 3d 673 at 678. This is but 
a restatement of the Utah rule requiring that the death not 
be the natural and probable consequence of the insured's 
actions. 
-9-
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S SUGGESTION THAT THE DEFINITION 
OF ACCIDENTAL DEATH BE REWRITTEN TO EXCLUDE 
ANY REFERENCE TO FORESEEABILITY IS CONTRARY 
TO THE LAW AND WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION. 
Appellant takes the position that this Court's settled 
definition of accidental death should be rewritten to exclude 
any reference to foreseeability. It is suggested that the 
logic of Sanders requires this, even though the outcome in 
Sanders hinged on a finding based upon unexpected result. 
This revision of the law would require the repudiation of the 
"natural and probable consequence" definition of Handley, 
Sanders, Elton, and numerous other Utah cases. Appellant's 
rationale for such action is three-fold. First, it is 
claimed that the modern legal trend is to abandon this rule. 
Second, that the word "accidental" in insurance contracts is 
ambiguous and therefore should be construed against the in-
sured. Third, foreseeability is a negligence doctrine which 
should not be mixed with insurance contract law. (Appel-
lant's Brief pp. 10-12.) 
With regard to the "modern legal trend" argument, it can 
hardly be said that a few courts adopting appellant's view in 
the last twenty years establishes a trend. All that it 
demonstrates is that a minority rule exists which is contrary 
-10-
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to the well-founded and long-established rule of this Court 
and, indeed the vast majority of jurisdictions. 
Claiming ambiguity and thus challenging the reasonable 
unforeseeability requirement places the insurer in a position 
uncontemplated by the parties. Without the concept of rea-
sonable unforeseeability, "accident" has no meaning. "Acci-
dent" insurance would be effectively eliminated. Under this 
approach, any death would be covered unless the precise cause 
of death were expressly excluded in the insurance policy. 
This would transform an accident policy into a life insurance 
policy, a result this Court rejected in Elton: 
The common acceptance of the term "accident" forti-
fied, as it is, by a small premium in "accident" as 
opposed to "health and accident" policies and "life 
insurance" policies would seem to be about the only 
protection a commercial insurance company has against 
any industrial, lexicological or judicial alchemy 
that otherwise virtually would transmute a simple 
accident policy into a health policy or a life insur-
ance policy. 516 P.2d at 172. 
In any event, the term "accident" is not ambiguous. As 
observed in Elton, "all of the definitions" of accident in-
elude the idea of unforeseeability, a "happening by chance." 
516 P.2d at 173. And, as stated in Handley, supra: 
This court has definitely gone on record as con-
struing the provision under discussion and equiva~ent 
provisions as reaching cases where the death or dis-
ablement is the unexpected result •••• 147 P.2d at 
322. 
The ambiguity argument and its untenable results have long 
-11-
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since been disposed of in Utah and do not now justify a 
departure from precedent. 
As to the argument that since foreseeability is included 
in negligence law it therefore cannot be applied in contract 
law, it too is faulty. The concept of foreseeability·cannot 
be limited to negligence law on a theory that foreseeability 
is an exclusive commodity that can only be used once in the 
law. The definition of accident includes the concept of 
foreseeability and should be so applied. Furthermore, if the 
foreseeability concept is limited to negligence law, then the 
application of this concept to lost profits, strict product 
liability, and other areas of the law is improper as well. 
Furthermore, appellant's averred concern with confusion 
based upon concepts of contributory negligence and compara-
tive fault are unjustified. The rule requires that the inci-
dent be examined from the position of the insured, that is 
whether the death is the natural and probable consequence of 
his actions. No reference is made in that definition to the 
intent or fault of others. Furthermore, there was no contri-
butory negligence or comparative fault in this matter since, 
in a separate case, the police officers were not found to be 
negligent. 
Appellant's attempts to reverse the long-standing Utah 
rule requiring reasonable unforeseeability in an accidental 
-12-
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death case is improper and should be rejected. 
POINT IV 
INSANITY DOES NOT CONVERT A NON-ACCIDENTAL 
DEATH INTO AN ACCIDENTAL DEATH. 
A. LOUIS' CLAIMED MENTAL ILLNESS DID NOT PREVENT HIM 
FROM UNDERSTANDING THE MORAL CHARACTER, GENERAL NATURE AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS LIFE THREATENING ACTIONS. 
Appellant argues that Louis had a mental disease at the 
time he confronted the police officers which "deprived him of 
the ability to make rational decisions about the consequences 
of his actions or to control his behavior in a light of pro-
bable consequences of such conduct." (Appellant's Brief 
p. 13.) Appellant contends that this claimed mental illness 
converts what would otherwise be a non-accidental death into 
an accidental death. 
The only testimony involving mental illness was that of 
Dr. Robert Mohr. (R. 112-132) Dr. Mohr testified that Louis 
was a high paranoid. He testified that by definition, a high 
paranoid is delusional in one area, but not others. Based 
upon his interviews with Louis and his prior acquaintance 
·with him in waterfowl hunting, he concluded that Louis was 
familiar with the dangers and uses of firearms and that this 
knowledge would not have been clouded or deluded by his high 
paranoia. (R. 117-119) In view of this evidence, the trial 
court understandably made no finding that Louis had a 
-13-
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mental illness which rendered him unable to understand the 
moral character, general nature and consequences of his 
actions in refusing to surrender his gun, in taking life-
threatening actions with it when confronted by armed police 
officers or in failing to understand the danger posed by the 
officers' guns. 
As noted earlier, any reversal on this point, assuming 
the law is as applicant claims, requires a showing that the 
trial court's decision on the issue of the mental illness of 
Louis was clearly erroneous. Although appellant did not 
indicate in her argument what evidence she was relying upon 
to show that the trial court's decision was clearly erron-
eous, it is presumed that reference is being made to Dr. 
Mohr's opinion that Louis' high paranoia would have affected 
his emotional state during the events leading to his death. 
(R. 115-117) At no time was Dr. Mohr asked nor did he testi-
fy that when commanded to surrender his weapon, Louis would 
not have been able to understand the moral character, general 
nature and consequences of his actions. Nor did he indicate 
that Louis' actions would be the insane impulse of a disor-
dered mind. To the contrary, Dr. Mohr testified that with 
regard to firearms and their dangers, Louis would not have 
been delusional. (R. 117-119) 
-14-
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Not only does the evidence fail to show that the trial 
court was clearly erroneous in not finding that the mental 
illness claimed by appellant was not such as to make his 
actions the insane impulse of a disordered mind, but the 
evidence establishes that such was not the case. 
B. SINCE EVERY PERSON IS HELD TO INTEND THE NATURAL AND 
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS, MENTAL ILLNESS DOES 
NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON WHETHER AN ACCIDENT HAS OCCURRED. 
Even assuming, for argument, that Louis was mentally ill 
and that his mental illness precluded him from recognizing 
the moral character, general nature and consequences of his 
life threatening actions, this does not make his death acci-
dental. As indicated earlier, the long-standing Utah rule 
requires that the death not be the natural and probable con-
sequence of the insured's actions. This definition places 
the emphasis on the actions of the insured, not his frame of 
mind. It is for this reason that this Court in Handley 
stated that a natural and probable consequence is either the 
"result of actual design, or falls under the maxim that every 
man must be held to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of his deeds." Put another way, the test is two-
fold. First, would a reasonable person standing in the place 
of the decedent have foreseen the result. If so, the death 
was not accidental. In addition, if an insured actually in-
-15-
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tended the result or had a physical ailment which made the 
result foreseeable, even though it would not have been a 
natural and probable consequence for an average or reasonable 
person, then the death would not have been accidental. 
This latter point was noted in Kellogg v. California 
Western States Life Insurance Co., 201 P.2d 949 (Utah 1949). 
There the insured died from post-operative shock. Prior to 
the operation everything appeared normal. However, when the 
incision was made, seventeen critical adhesions were found 
that required considerable time and great care. The discov-
ery of the adhesions made the insured a poor surgical risk. 
The trial court found that this death was not accidental. In 
affirming, this Court relied on the rule in Handley and held 
that although under the first part of the Handley test the 
death would be accidental, under the second part of the test 
there were special conditions which made the insured's death 
expected. The court did not abandon the maxim that every man 
must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence 
of his deeds. The court simply held that the insured's con-
dition made what would ordinarily have been an accidental 
death into a non-accidental death. This is the converse to 
what appellant now seeks. 
As discussed earlier, this concept of accidental death 
being a death not the natural and probable consequence of the 
-16-
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insured's actions is the distinguishing feature between an 
accident policy and a life or health policy. If, as appel-
lant argues, a mental illness shifts the emphasis from a 
focus on actions to mental capacity, the definition would be 
changed. The change would be such that a person with·a men-
tal illness would have his accidental death insurance policy 
converted to a life insurance policy for death resulting from 
his actions. For the same small premium, he would have far 
more extensive coverage than a sane individual. As indicated 
in Elton, supra, the term accident should not be transmuted 
by "judicial alchemy" so that an accident policy becomes a 
life insurance policy. 
Appellant discusses two cases in support of her theory. 
In the first, Kobylakiewicz v. Prudental Insurance Company of 
North America, 180 A. 491 (N.J. 1935), the insured had been 
confined to a state hospital for the insane. Within a short 
time after his release, he became very violent and threatened 
his family. When the police attempted to arrest him, the 
insured rushed them with a pick axe acting like a "wildman." 
In the attempt to arrest him, he was shot and killed. The 
court there found that the insured's death was accidental. 
However, the basis for that decision was not an exception to 
the rule discussed in Handley. The court there noted that in 
New Jersey an accident is an event that takes place without 
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the insured's foresight or expectation. In other words, a 
subjective test was used rather than the objective test fol-
lowed in Handley and the other Utah cases. Under such a 
test, the insured's mental capacity would be relevant. Since 
this is not the rule in Utah, the case is irrelevant. -
The second case cited by the appellant is Continental 
Casualty Company v. Maguire, 471 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1970). 
There the insured had been hospitalized for mental illness 
four times in the ten years preceding his injury. After his 
last release, he threatened his wife with a gun. When the 
police attempted to pursuade him to surrender, he shot and 
inflicted superficial wounds on an officer. The police re-
sponded by firing ten tear gas canisters into his home, one 
of which exploded in his face and blinded him. The court 
found the injuries to be accidental on three grounds. First, 
the insured was not engaged in aggressive acts at the time 
the canister exploded in his eyes. Second, it was never 
intended that the teargas cansiter should injure him. Third, 
the court found that he was insane at the time and therefore 
did not have the ability to recognize the moral character, 
general nature and consequences of his actions. In so find-
ing, the court relied on Kobylakiewicz. Although appellant 
suggests that Colorado follows the Utah rule, such is not the 
case. As noted in Reed v. United States Fidelity and Guaran-
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ty Company, 491 P.2d 1377 (Colo. 1971), Colorado follows a 
test in which an event is accidental if it is not the natural 
or probable consequence of the means which produced it or 
which the actor did not intend to produce. Although the 
first part of the Colorado test is similar to the Utah test, 
the second part, on which the court relied, is contrary to 
the Utah rule. It is the same subjective standard applied in 
Kobylakiewicz. This case is also irrelevant. 
Where courts have adopted the same rule which has been 
applied in Utah, the courts have held that the mental state 
of the insured is irrelevant in determining whether an acci-
dent has occurred. This was pointed out in Carlyle v. Equity 
Benefit Life Insurance Company, 551 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. Okla. 
1976). There the insured was killed while committing an 
armed robbery. The trial court held that his death was not 
accidental. In affirming this decision, the appellate court 
reviewed the various jurisdictions on this issue. The court 
noted that a minority of jurisdictions apply a subjective 
test which make the mental state of the insured relevant. 
The court went on to note and accept the majority position 
requiring the objective standard of reasonable unforeseeabil-
ity: 
The majority of courts, on the other hand, tend to 
pay less attention to the assumed mental state of the 
insured and evaluate the facts and circumstances from 
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the viewpoint of a reasonable person. The conclusion 
usually reached is that death is just too likely, too 
foreseeable, too natural a consequence of a serious 
law violation to justify the contention that it was 
the result of an accident. 551 P.2d at 666. 
The Utah rule requiring the application of an objective 
test is not altered by any finding that the insured was not 
capable of understanding the moral character, general nature 
and consequences of his actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Louis Hoffman's death was the natural and probable conse-
quence of his refusal to surrender his gun and his life-
threatening actions with the gun. It was not accidental. 
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Dated this day of May, 1982. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
H. James Clegg 
By 
Henry K. Chai II 
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